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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
MARCO VILLALOBOS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 981794-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for burglary of a dwelling, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995), and aggravated 
robbery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995). This 
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following issues are presented to the Court for review, together with the 
respective standards of appellate review: 
FIRST ISSUE ON APPEAL. Did the trial judge improperly remark on defendant's 
appearance and identity at trial? 
1 
I 
Standard of Review. Because defense counsel did not object to any of the court's 
remarks at trial, this issue is reviewed for plain error. State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, f 6, 4 ' 
P.3d 778. 
SECOND ISSUE ON APPEAL. Was defendant denied the effective assistance of counsel 
i 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution? 
Standard of Review. When a defendant is represented by new counsel on appeal andv 
1 
the record is adequate to review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court 
reviews the claim as a matter of law. State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998).-
Nevertheless, the Court "indulge[s] in the strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls i 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct 2052, 2065 (1984); accord State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 
(Utah 1990) (quoting). 
THIRD ISSUE ON APPEAL. Did the trial court fail to comply with section 77-18-
l(6)(a), Utah Code Annotated, by not resolving defendant's allegation that he was 
erroneously assessed two points on the presentence investigation report for use of a board 
during the robbery?
 { 
Standard of Review. "Whether the trial court properly complied with a legal duty is 
a question of law that [the appellate court] reviewfs] for correctness." State v. Veteto, 2000 
I 
UT 62, f 13, — Utah Adv. Rep. —, — P.2d —. 
\ 
2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
The interpretation of section 77-18-l(6)(a), Utah Code Annotated, is relevant to a 
determination of this case. That section provides: 
The [Department of Corrections] shall provide the presentence investigation 
report to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by 
counsel, the prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to 
sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, 
which have not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to 
sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the 
judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve the alleged 
inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten working days the 
inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a determination of 
relevance and accuracy on the record. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Defendant and two co-perpetrators, Victor McDonald and William Screws, were 
charged with burglary of a dwelling and aggravated robbery. R. 01-02, 63. A magistrate 
took evidence at a preliminary hearing and bound defendant over for trial on both counts. 
R. 08-09. Following a two-day trial, a jury convicted defendant as charged. R. 17-22, 54. 
The trial court entered written findings of fact pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 
(1995), finding that defendant acted in concert with two or more persons and that he was 
therefore subject to an enhanced penalty under the statute.1 R. 61-63. The trial court 
defendant was tried together with Victor McDonald who was also convicted. See 
R. 17-22,63. William Screws pled guilty as charged and testified for the State. R. 63; R. 
176: 121-22. 
3 
sentenced defendant to indeterminate prison terms of one-to-fifteen years for each offense. 
R. 159-61. The court suspended imposition of the enhancement penalty. R. 162-63. 
Defendant timely appealed. R. 170. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
The Robbery 
In December 1997, Steven Tiede lived at his mother's house in a large bedroom built -
directly above the garage.2 R. 176: 47-48, 50. That month, he had broken up with his -
girlfriend, Tiffany Hill, over her association with another man, Victor McDonald. R. 176? 
65-67,98-99. Two days before Christmas, Tiede received a telephone call from McDonald 
and his friend, William Screws, at which time both men accused Tiede of physically abusing 
Hill. R. 176: 113-14. In the early morning hours of the following day, Tiede and his then 
current girlfriend, Ashley Cloward, lay asleep in bed when a black blazer driven by defendant 
pulled into the driveway. See R. 176: 50-51, 98, 116, 127, 143, 151-52; R. 177: 295. 
Defendant exited the blazer, as did McDonald and Screws. R. 63; R. 176: 51, 53, 154. 
Defendant followed McDonald and Screws up the outside stairs of the home and into the 
hallway where they began banging on Tiede's bedroom door. R. 63; R. 176: 51 -54; 151; R. 
177: 257.3 When Tiede did not respond, Screws kicked in the door and the three entered the 
bedroom. R. 176: 51,116-17,153-54. 
2Although the transcript of the trial spells Mr. Tiede's name "Teedy," the correct 
spelling appears to be "Tiede" as reflected in his subpoena to appear in court. R. 55. 
3The outside staircase led to a small hallway on the second floor of the home, 
providing access to Tiede's bedroom and to the main part of the house. R. 176: 47-48. 
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Once inside, defendant began searching the bedroom for marijuana as he and the other 
two men had previously planned. R. 177: 258-59. Finding none, defendant turned his 
attention to Tiede's personal belongings and began packing out valuables to the car. R. 176: 
56-58, 69, 164, 166-67; R. 177: 259. Screws also joined defendant in rummaging through 
the bedroom and taking Tiede's valuables. R. 176: 56-58, 119-20, 210, 215. Among the 
items stolen by defendant and Screws were a CD stereo, a VCR, numerous CDs, a cable box, 
a coat, and a black light. R. 176: 56-58, 68-69. 
In the meantime, McDonald, periodically joined by Screws, angrily confronted Tiede, 
accusing him of maligning McDonald to another person and of physically abusing Tiede's 
former girlfriend, Tiffany Hill. R. 176: 55-57, 65-66, 85-87, 94-95, 117-18, 158-59, 211-
240; R. 177: 256. As McDonald yelled at Tiede with raised fists, Screws repeatedly tapped 
Tiede on the chin with a board he had picked up on the way into the house. R. 176: 57,95, 
142,160,163,165. When the two threatened to take Tiede outside and beat him up, Ashley 
Cloward grabbed the telephone and dialed 9-1-1. R. 176: 58,160,165,195-96,217. Before 
she could report the robbery, however, McDonald and Screws wrestled the telephone from 
her, breaking it in the process. R. 58,160,191,211. 
Hearing the commotion, Tiede's mother knocked on the wall asking Tiede to quiet 
down. R. 176: 58,60,161-62,183. When Tiede sarcastically apologized to his mother and 
responded that he was getting robbed, the three men assured her that everything was "cool," 
told her not to worry, and fled out the door. R. 176:84-85,165,181. With Tiede's valuables 
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in tow, defendant drove away from the home and dropped McDonald and Screws off at a 
friend's house. R. 176: 120. 
Identification of Defendant 
Police later asked Tiede and Cloward if they recognized the robbers from a book 
containing the booking photographs of various arrestees. R. 176: 97; R. 177:287-88. They 
immediately identified McDonald as one of the robbers. R. 177: 288, 291. However, 
because defendant's photograph was not very good, neither Tiede nor Cloward was able to-*'* 
identify him as one of the robbers at that time. See R. 176: 80,97,172-73; R. 177:287-88, 
291. R. 176:172-73. Tiede and Cloward also failed to identify Screws as one of the robbers. 
See R. 196:97. 
Sometime after McDonald's arrest for the home robbery, Tiede's car was stolen, 
apparently while Tiede and Cloward were present in the car.4 SeeK. 176:122-23,220. After 
the victims identified Screws as one of the perpetrators, Screws was arrested for aggravated 
robbery. R. 177: 290-91. At that time, Cloward and Tiede also recognized Screws as the 
second man involved in the earlier home robbery and he was charged accordingly, leaving 
defendant still uncharged in the home robbery. See R. 177:290-91. Although defendant was 
wearing a mask during the second robbery and apparently could not be identified by the 
victims, he was implicated as one of the perpetrators in the second robbery and charged with 
Screws. See R. 176: 220. Later, while testifying at the preliminary hearing on the second 
4The theft of the car resulted in the filing of aggravated robbery charges against 
Screws and defendant. See R. 176: 123-24; R. 183: 18-19. 
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robbery—which preceded the preliminary hearing in this case, Cloward recognized defendant 
as the third man involved in the home robbery. R. 176: 203, 220-21. After Cloward 
informed the prosecutor and submitted a written statement to police, defendant was formally 
charged in this case. R. 176: 203-04; R. 177: 291. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Trial Court Remarks. Defendant contends that the trial court's remarks which 
touched on defendant's possible hispanic background and his physical appearance effectively 
told the jury that the State had sufficiently proven identity. The remarks, however, were 
made in the proper exercise of the court's duties in voir dire and in ruling on objections. They 
did not constitute opinions on the strength of the State's evidence regarding identity or 
otherwise. Moreover, to the extent the remarks were improper, any error was harmless. The 
court plainly instructed the jury regarding its role as fact finder, the State's burden of proof 
relating to identity, and the presumption of innocence. In addition, defendant's identity as 
one of the robbers was not only established by the testimony of the two victims, but also by 
one of the robbers. 
Assistance of Counsel Defendant contends that counsel was ineffective by failing 
to adequately advocate his client's cause, failing to adequately prepare for trial, and not 
having adequate trial experience. Defendant's claims lack merit. The challenged remarks 
by counsel were well within the realm of reasonable trial strategy and defendant has failed 
to show prejudice in any event. Counsel's alleged misunderstanding regarding the victim 
who could not independently identify defendant as one of the robbers was adequately 
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addressed during cross-examination. Finally, any evidence that counsel lacked trial 
experience was insufficient to establish that he was ineffective. 
Objection to Presentence Investigation Report. The State agrees that the trial court 
failed to resolve defendant's objection to the presentence investigation report. Accordingly, 
the case should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to resolve the objection in 
accordance with statute. However, defendant does not argue on appeal, nor did he argue 
below, that the alleged error affected his sentence. Accordingly, this Court should not disturb^ ,m^ 
defendant's sentence. 
ARGUMENT .,„«,-- - ^ 
I. ANYIMPROPERCOMMENTBYTHETRIALJUTCEONDEFXNDANT'S 
IDENTITY OR APPEARANCE WAS HARMLESS. 
Defendant first contends the trial court improperly commented on the evidence in a 
way that signaled to the jury that the State had sufficiently identified defendant as one of the 
robbers. Aplt. Brf. at 19. Specifically, defendant alleges that the trial judge improperly 
i 
remarked that: (1) defendant appeared to be hispanic; (2) the case was not about a "widow's 
peak;" and (3) the witness had already testified that she believed defendant to have dark skin. 
Aplt. Brf. at 19-20. Because defense counsel did not object to any of these remarks, \ 
defendant must demonstrate that the trial judge's remarks amounted to plain error. Parker, 
2000 UT 51,16. To do so, defendant must first meet the threshold burden of showing that 
the judge's remarks constituted error. Id. at ^  7 (citing State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208 
(Utah 1993)). If he meets that threshold, defendant must demonstrate that the error was both 
•' 1 
8 
plain and harmful. See id. (citing Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208). In other words, "it should have 
been obvious to [the] trial court that it was committing error" and the error must have been 
"of sufficient magnitude" to create "a reasonable likelihood that absent the error, the outcome 
below would have been more favorable." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989) 
(internal quotations omitted). Defendant has failed to meet that burden. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "a court may not comment on the weight of the 
evidence presented at trial or comment on the merits of the case in such a way that indicates 
a preference toward either party." State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975,980 (Utah 1998). None of 
the challenged comments of the trial judge, when viewed in the context in which they were 
given, constituted an inappropriate remark on the weight of the evidence nor did they imply 
that the court held a preference toward the prosecution. 
A. The Trial Court's Voir Dire Comment That Defendant's Name 
Suggested He Had a Hispanic Background Was Not Error. 
Defendant first claims the judge improperly remarked at the beginning of trial that 
defendant appeared to be hispanic . Aplt. Brf. at 19. He argues that the court's statement 
directly related to Tiede's statement that one of the robbers was Mexican. Aplt. Brf. at 20. 
However, a reading of the court's remark, in the context it was given, reveals that the 
comment did not relate to Tiede's physical description of the robber as Mexican, but rather 
appropriately explored jury bias during voir dire. Moreover, any error in the comment was 
harmless. 
9 
During voir dire, the trial court explained its role in identifying jurors who may harbor 
unwarranted biases. In this vein, the court stated: 
You can see ladies and gentlemen as we are asking these questions there 
is a true attempt on the part of the court to alleviate any bias that may linger at 
all as it relates to anyone who may have any knowledge of the facts or have 
formed any opinion or have a background that could influence a decision in 
this case. So that we are not attempting to probe into your private lives or 
anything for any other purpose than to seat a jury that will be fair. 
Okay. Next, ladies and gentlemen, you can see that the one defendant is 
Victor McDonald [who] appears to be an African American[.] Marco **:, 
Villalobos appears to have a Hispanic background of some sortfj at least a 
name that would suggest that. I am going to ask you whether by virtue of that ^ r 
mere fact that these defendants are minorities, would that in anyway affect 
your ability, in this case, to listen carefully to the evidence[,] to weigh it -
impartially and to reach a true and just and fair verdict? Okay. 
R. 176: 20 (emphasis added). In other words, the judge did not, as defendant suggests, 
indicate that defendant physically appeared to be hispanic. Rather, the judge indicated that 
based on defendant's name, he appeared to have a "hispanic background." R. 176: 20 
(emphasis added). Tiede testified that he had seen defendant before, but that he did not know 
his name. See R. 176: 53, 73. As such, the trial court's comment that defendant appeared 
to have an hispanic background based on his name in no way relates to Tiede's physical 
description of the robber as being Mexican. 
Moreover, the trial court's inquiry regarding racial or ethnic biases was consistent 
with its duty to ferret out those who could not render fair and impartial judgment because of 
personal biases or prejudices. As held by the Utah Supreme Court, "[v]oir dire is intended 
to provide a tool for counsel and the court to carefully and skillfully determine, by inquiry, 
10 
whether biases and prejudices, latent as well as acknowledged, will interfere with a fair trial 
if a particular juror serves in it." State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1984). 
In any event, defendant has failed to adequately explain how the remark was 
prejudicial. He fails to demonstrate that the allegedly improper comment was "of sufficient 
magnitude" as to create "a reasonable likelihood that absent the error, the outcome below 
would have been more favorable." Verde, 770 P.2d at 122 (internal quotations omitted). In 
the first place, to the extent the remarks were improper at all, the trial court remedied any 
error by appropriately instructing the jury. See State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 271 (Utah 
1998) (holding that "curative instructions are a settled and necessary feature of our judicial 
process and one of the most important tools by which a court may remedy errors at trial"). 
Rule 19(d), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that "if the [trial] court refers to any 
of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the exclusive judges of all questions of 
fact." In accordance with that rule, the trial court below specifically instructed the jury 
members that they .were "the sole judges of all questions of fact, of the weight of the 
evidence and the credibility of the witnesses." R. 32. The court also made it clear to the jury 
that the identification of the defendant was critical to the case, instructing the jury as follows: 
One of the issues in this case is the identification of the defendant as the 
person who committed the crime. The prosecution has the burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was committed and that the 
defendant was the person who committed the crime. If, after considering all 
of the evidence you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant is the person who committed the crime, you must find the defendant 
not guilty. If, however, you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant is the person who committed the crime then you must return a 
verdict of guilty. 
11 
R. 45. The court further instructed the jury that "[t]hQ identification testimony that [they] 
heard was an expression of belief or impression by the witness which may or may not be 
accurate" and the court then identified factors which the jury should consider in assessing the 
accuracy of the identification. R. 45 (emphasis added). Later, the trial court cautioned the 
jury as follows: 
Neither in these Instructions nor in any ruling, action, or remark that I :zfr£ 
have made during the course of this trial have I intended to interpose any 
opinion or suggestion as to how I would resolve any of the issues of this case. ^& 
R.40. 
The foregoing instructions plainly advised the jury that the State had the burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt defendant's identity as one of the three robbers. The 
instructions clearly advised the jury that they were the sole judges of the evidence and that 
any remarks or actions by the court should not be regarded as an opinion on the strength of 
the evidence. Therefore, to the extent the court's voir dire comment was improper at all, it 
was not "so prejudicial as to defeat the mitigating effect of the court's... instructions." See 
State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, f24, 999 P.2d 7. The instructions were strong and direct, 
mitigating any innocuous comment by the trial judge in properly exercising his duties. 
Moreover, defendant does not contend that he does not appear to be hispanic. Atrial 
court cannot prejudice a defendant by stating that which is obvious to the jury. Additionally, 
both Tiede and Cloward positively identified defendant at trial as the third robber and 
testified that he stole personal belongings from Tiede's room. R. 176: 53-54, 56-58, 155, 
166-67. Their testimony was fully corroborated by one of the three robbers, William Screws, 
12 
who testified that defendant was in fact one of the three men who participated in the robbery. 
Screws testified that defendant drove him and McDonald to Tiede's house, knowing of their 
intention to confront Tiede and take marijuana. R. 176: 115-16, 120. He testified that after 
they broke into the bedroom, defendant took property from Tiede's room. R. 176: 119-20. 
Finally, he testified that defendant drove them away from the scene, dropping Screws and 
McDonald off, along with the stolen property, at a friend's home. R. 176: 120. 
B. The Trial Court's Explanatory Remark Cutting off Further 
Questions Regarding a "Widow's Peak" Was Proper. 
Defendant also challenges the trial court's remark about the "widow's peak." Aplt. 
Brf. at 19. That remark, however, was made in the context of a ruling on an objection and 
was not improper. During cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Ashley Cloward 
regarding her prior statement that the "Mexican" robber had a widow's peak. See R. 176: 
175. Pointing to defendant at trial, defense counsel asked Cloward if he had a widow's peak. 
R. 176: 175. She testified that defendant's hair^ was now (at the trial) different, that it was 
longer, cut different; and down. R. 176:175. She reiterated, however, that at the time of the 
robbery, defendant's hair was slicked back and that "he had a line and then a little peak and 
then a line." R. 176:175. Defense counsel then directed defendant to pull back his hair and 
asked, "That is a Widow's Peak?" R. 176:175. Cloward testified in the affirmative. R. 176: 
175. 
After further questioning Cloward's characterization of defendant's hair as having a 
widow's peak, as well as her failure to identify defendant in the mug book, counsel asked, 
13 
"How big does it have to be before it is a Widow's Peak?" R. 176: 176. The prosecutor 
objected and the court sustained the objection. R. 176: 176. Defense counsel responded that 
they were "talking about a very identifiable characteristic" that he didn't believe defendant 
had. R. 176: 176. When the prosecutor rejoined that the witness had just testified that 
defendant had a widow's peak, the trial court stated: 
Well, the complication is that she has identified it and she has identified it on •? 
him today and you can say for argument that he doesn't have a Widow's Peak 
or he does have a Widow's Peak and she has testified that he does. Now this 
case is not about a Widow's Peak. 
R. 176:176. 
The Utah Supreme has held that '"the extent of cross-examination with respect to an 
appropriate subject of inquiry is within the sound discretion of the trial court" and it may 
therefore "'exercise a reasonable judgment in determining when the subject is exhausted."' 
State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 281 (Utah 1989) {quoting Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 
132, 88 S.Ct. 748, 750 (1968)), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1090, 110 S.Ct. 1837 (1990). The 
Court has also recognized that "trial judges retain wide latitude . . . to impose reasonable 
limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or 
only marginally relevant." State v. Williams, 773 P.2d 1368,1372 (Utah 1989). The trial 
court's remark was made in the proper exercise of its discretion in determining that the 
subject had been adequately exhausted.5 In so ruling, the court implicitly held that 
defendant has not claimed on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in 
cutting off further questioning, and, in any case, the court later permitted further 
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defendant's alleged widow's peak had been adequately explored and further questioning 
would be cumulative or create a risk of confusing the issues. In short, the remark was 
explanatory in nature and was appropriate in the context of the court's ruling on the 
objection. See Alonzo, 973 P.2d at 980 (finding that a trial judge's remarks did not constitute 
reversible error in part because they were "merely explanatory in nature"). 
Moreover, any error in making the comment was harmless. As discussed above, the 
court gave accurate and succinct instructions advising the jury regarding the State's burden 
of proof with respect to identity, the presumption of innocence, and the role of the jury as fact 
finder. Moreover, in addition to these instructions, which were given after all parties had 
rested, the court gave the following clarifying instruction shortly after its remark that the case 
was not about a widow's peak: 195-96. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, a few moments ago I did not allow any additional questions 
regarding a Widow's Peak and I indicated that this case is not about a Widow's Peak. 
Let me clarify that if I will. Issues of identification are always important in a 
criminal case. I sustained the objection because I considered the phrase or the focus 
to be inappropriate. But I am going to allow him, counsel, to explore the within the 
bounds to explore her perception of the Widow's Peak. With that, we will simply 
clarify that the issues of identification including a Widow's Peak are always 
important in a criminal case, always. So I may have sustained the objection as it 
relates to the nature of the question but counsel may now proceed and ask questions 
regarding the issue of a Widow's Peak. Please disregard any comments that I have 
made in connection with the earlier objection. 
R. 176:197. This instruction, given in the midst oftrial when the issue was fresh in the jury's 
mind, again advised the jury that the issue of identification was important in the case and 
expressly directed the jury to disregard any comments which could be construed as stating 
questioning on the subject. See infra, p. ??. 
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otherwise. Accordingly, to the extent the court's explanatory remark improperly commented 
on the evidence, any harm occasioned by the remark was rendered benign by the instructions. 
See Kohl, 2000 UT 35, f24. Counsel had explored the subject ad nauseum, Cloward 
maintained that he had a widow's peak, and the jury could judge her credibility in that regard 
based on its own observation of defendant. ^ 
C. The Trial Court's Explanatory Remark Cutting off Further 
Questions Regarding Defendant's Skin Color Was Proper. 
Defendant also complains that the trial court improperly commented on the evidence 
in its remark concerning Cloward's description of defendant as having dark skin. Aplt. Brf. 
at 19-20. Again, however, defendant has not placed the court's remark in the context in 
which it was given. As in the other two challenged remarks, a reading of the transcript 
reveals that the trial court's comment did not constitute an improper comment on the 
evidence. 
During counsel's cross-examination of Ms. Cloward, she testified that Mexicans have 
"dark hair" and that their complexion is darker. R. 176: 171. She then testified that she 
described the robber as Mexican because he had dark hair and his complexion was darker. 
R. 176: 171-72. However, to undermine her assessment that the third robber was Mexican, 
counsel elicited testimony from Cloward that the robber also could have been Italian or 
Iranian. R. 176: 172. He then asked her, "Isn't it true that this kind of became a self 
fulfilling prophecy and you thought he was a Mexican and you became hell bent on finding 
a Mexican?" R. 176: 172. Cloward responded, "Kind of." R. 176: 172. 
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On re-cross examination, Cloward again testified that defendant "is darker complexed 
[sic] and he has dark hair." R. 176: 199. Counsel questioned this characterization of 
defendant, and attempted to elicit the standard by which Cloward determined who has dark 
skin by asking her to identify jurors or celebrities who have dark skin. R. 176: 199-201. The 
prosecutor objected to counsel's line of questioning on the grounds that the witness had 
already testified that she considered defendant to have dark skin and that she had already 
defined dark skin in her vernacular. R. 176: 201. When defense counsel retorted that the 
jury did not know her vernacular, the trial court held: 
The jury knows her vernacular because she has identified this gentleman and 
has indicated that he has dark skin. They can see and they know and whether 
that is their perception or not it doesn't matter. I will sustain the objection of 
counsel. 
R. 176:201. 
The trial court's remarks, therefore, like its remarks regarding the widow's peak, were 
merely explanatory in nature in sustaining the prosecutor's objection. SeeAlonzo, 973 P.2d 
at 980. The court had already heard extensive testimony from Cloward as to whom she 
considered to have dark skin and her opinion that defendant had dark skin. Consistent with 
its broad discretion in managing the examination of witnesses, the trial court concluded that 
the subject had been exhausted and further questioning on the subject was unnecessary. See 
Gardner, 789 P.2d at 281. 
Moreover, and as in the other two challenged remarks, any impropriety in the 
comment was harmless. The court adequately instructed the jury regarding its role as fact 
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finder and the State's burden of proving identity. Supra, at 11 -12. The court also instructed 
the jury that none of its remarks should be construed as offering an opinion on the strength 
of the evidence. R. 40. Finally, the jury could see for themselves whether or not defendant 
could fairly be characterized as having dark skin. 
* * * 
In summary, none of the challenged remarks by the trial court constituted error, 
obvious or otherwise. Trial counsel understood the remarks for what they were—reasonable 
explanations given by the court in the context of the trial. For this reason he did not object. 
To the extent that they could be considered error, the comments were not of a nature that "it 
should have been obvious to [the] trial court that it was committing error." One remark was 
made in an effort to ensure an unbiased jury and two were made in explaining the court's 
decision to sustain objections. Verde, 770 P.2d at 122. Moreover, given the strongly-worded 
and salient instructions regarding the jury's role as fact finder and the State's burden to 
establish identity, it cannot be said, as defendant contends, that the trial court in effect told 
the jury "that the State had sufficiently proven identity and identity was therefore no longer 
at issue." See Aplt. Brf. at 21. Moreover, in light of the eyewitness testimony that defendant 
was one of the three robbers, any arguably inappropriate comments by the trial judge were 
not "of sufficient magnitude" to create "a reasonable likelihood that absent the error, the 
outcome below would have been more favorable." Verde, 770P.2dat 122. 
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II. DEFENDANT RECEIVED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTION. 
Defendant next claims that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel 
guaranteed under the United States Constitution. Aplt. Brf. at 21. Defendant makes 
numerous allegations of deficient performance which can be divided into the following 
categories: (1) failure to advocate defendant's cause; (2) failure to adequately prepare for 
trial; and (3) inadequate trial experience.6 These claims are frivolous. 
When, as here, a defendant is represented by new counsel on appeal and the record 
is adequate to review an ineffectiveness claim, this Court reviews the claim as a matter of 
law. Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50. Nevertheless, the Court 4"indulge[s] in the strong presumption 
that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.'" 
Templin, 805 P.2d at 186 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065). To 
succeed on an ineffectiveness claim, a defendant must meet the two-prong test set forth in 
Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687,104 S.Ct. 2052,2064 (1984). A conviction will 
not be reversed unless the defendant meets "the heavy burden of showing that (1) trial 
counsel rendered deficient performance which fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment, and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him." Chacon, 
962 P.2d at 50. Because defendant must meet both prongs of the test, the Court "may address 
6The State has treated defendant's first and fifth allegations of ineffective 
assistance, Aplt. Brf. at 22,24, under the same general category. Defendant's third and 
fourth allegations of ineffective assistance, Aplt. Brf. at 22-24, are also treated under the 
same general category. 
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whichever [prong] will most readily resolve the claim." State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 580 
(Utah App. 1993) {citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2069). 
A. Trial Advocacy. 
1. The Challenged Remarks Were Strategic Techniques to Further 
the Defense. 
"Representation of a criminal defendant entails certain basic duties," including "the:, 
overarching duty to advocate the defendant's cause." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688,104 S.Ct. 
at 2065. Defendant contends that his trial counsel failed in that duty in several ways. He 
contends that counsel failed to show a willingness to identify himself with his interests byr : 
indicating that he would rather be teaching Spanish. Aplt. Brf. at 22. He also complains that 
trial counsel created a negative impression of him by referring to the "Dam [sic] Sure Rule," 
and comparing him to President Clinton. Aplt Brf. at 24; see R. 176: 228-29. Defendant, \ 
however, neither explains the context in which the statements were given, nor does he 
explain how they undermine confidence in the trial's ultimate outcome. See Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 694, 104 S.Gt. at 2068. 
When asked to identify himself to the venire panel, defense counsel gave his name and 
indicated that he was happily married and had four little girls. R. 176: 16. He then stated: ! 
"I am a lawyer but love teaching Spanish in a high school in Salt Lake. That is what I would 
rather be doing today." R. 176: 16. He then indicated that he had a law firm in Salt Lake 
City, with two other lawyers, that primarily represented indigent people. R. 176: 16. The 
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statement was innocuous, given in an introduction about himself and what he did. It did not 
imply in any manner that he believed his client to be guilty or unworthy of a defense. 
Counsel's reference to the "Dam [sic] Sure Rule" came in his opening statement as 
he explained the burden required of the State to prove defendant's guilt. Counsel explained: 
In the United States of America we believe that a person should not go 
to prison if there is reasonable doubt. That doesn't mean that a person should 
go to prison if the jury just thinks someone is guilty. It is what I like to call the 
Dam [sic] Sure Rule. That is the rule. 
R. 176: 228. Following this remark, the court asked counsel to approach the bench, 
apparently asking him to refrain from using the word "damn." See R. 176: 228. Counsel 
then continued: 
I will start over. In the United States, we don't convict people of crimes 
if there is a reasonable doubt that they are innocent. It is not enough that 
somebody thinks that I think that person did that. That is not enough. In civil 
trials, if you top the scales against somebody the person who has the scales 
tipped against them looses [sic] anything above 50 percent. 
That is not the case here. We are dealing with, I mean in Utah County we 
are dealing with a Darn Sure Rule here. You got to be dam sure. As I am 
putting on my case[,] I want you to ask yourselves are you dam sure that my 
client is lying? Are you dam sure that his mother is lying? Are you dam sure 
that his brother is lying? Are you dam sure that the evidence is so against my 
client that he just couldn't be telling the truth and you just can't believe him 
in simply thinking that he might not be telling the truth. That isn't enough. 
R. 176: 228. As is readily apparent from this context, the statement did not, as defendant 
suggests, cast him in a negative light. It was simply a phrase used by counsel to help him 
describe for the jury the heavy burden of proof the State must meet to attain a conviction. 
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Finally, counsel did not, as defendant suggests, compare him to President Clinton in 
the sense that he lied or was untrustworthy. Reference to President Clinton was made during 
counsel's opening statement and in the context of explaining reasonable doubt and the 
presumption of innocence. Counsel stated: 
The President of the United States, Bill Clinton, we see a presumption of 
the innocence. The guy is accused and people jump to his side and say that 
well, you know that isn't necessary. We might be a people who say these .?-? 
things and you look at them one by one but none of them are credible. 
Now my client is just as much a citizen of this country as the President 
is. He is entitled to the same degree of reasonable doubt as he is. :^ 
R. 176: 229. After the prosecutor objected to the reference of a pending case, counsel\~..?r$m$. 
concluded: 
Thank you, Judge. Every citizen is entitled to the same evidentiary 
standard, whether it is the highest citizen of the land or the lowest[,] the same 
evidentiary standard. That is what we are going to ask you to apply as you 
hear our case, thank you. 
R. 176:230. In other words, counsel's reference to President Clinton was to the presumption 
of innocence to which not only a president was entitled, but also to which his client was 
entitled. It did not impugn defendant's character, but helped explain his rights and the jury's 
obligation. 
* * * 
In short, counsel's revelation to the jury that he would rather be teaching Spanish was 
a simple tactic to personalize himself to the jury, demonstrating that he, like the jury, had 
interests other than the case at bar. Likewise, his remarks about the "Damn Sure Rule" and 
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President Clinton were techniques to help him explain the State's burden of proof and the 
presumption of innocence. The courts have long recognized that "trial tactics and strategies 
are within counsel's prerogative and are generally left to counsel's professional judgment." 
Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 876 (Utah 1993). If, as is clearly the case here, "the 
challenged act or omission might be considered sound trial strategy, [this Court] will not find 
that it demonstrates inadequacy of counsel." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1225. 
2. The Challenged Remarks Did Not Prejudice the Defense. 
In any case, defendant wholly fails to explain how the statements prejudiced his 
defense. It is not enough to claim that the statements created a negative impression of 
defendant in the jury's minds or that they demonstrated counsel's unwillingness to identify 
himself with defendant's interests. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. at 2067 
(holding that "[i]t is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some 
conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding"). Defendant has not shown, as is his 
burden, that absent the remarks, a reasonable probability exits that "the factfinder would have 
had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt." Id. at 695,104 S.Ct. at 2068-69. 
The statement that counsel would prefer to be teaching Spanish personalized counsel 
to the jury and was isolated. The references to the "Dam [sic] Sure Rule" and President 
Clinton were tools in explaining legal principles. Moreover, as explained supra, at 12-13, 
the evidence against defendant was compelling—not only did the two victims testify that 
defendant was one of the three robbers, but one of the three robbers confirmed that 
testimony. R. 176: 53-54,56-58,115-16,119-20,155,166-67. Moreover, the record shows 
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that counsel vigorously represented defendant's interests throughout the trial. In closing, 
counsel argued to the jury that the case against defendant was "pathetically weak." R. 177: 
313. He attacked Tiede's identification of defendant in court, pointing out his inability to 
identify him in the mug book. R. 177: 314. He pointed out inconsistencies in the witnesses 
statements. R. 177:314-15. He pointed out that none ofdefendant's fingerprints were lifted - v 
from the scene although the testimony indicated that he had his hands on everything in the r 
bedroom. R. 177: 316. In short, defendant has failed to demonstrate "a reasonable ^ : 
probability that, absent the [remarks], the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt " -
respecting guilt." See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695,104 S.Ct. at 2068-69. «•** m 
B. Trial Preparation. 
Defendant also argues that his attorney's cross-examination of Tiede, as reported on 
pages 71 -73 of the transcript, demonstrate that he did not adequately prepare for trial. Aplt. 
Brf. at 22 (pages 70-74 of the transcript are reproduced in Addendum A). Defendant's claim 
is unsubstantiated. 
Defendant first claims the transcript demonstrates that counsel first interviewed Tiede 
only a few minutes before cross-examination. Aplt. Brf. at 22. That is not the case. Tiede 
had just testified during cross-examination by McDonald's attorney that he had not talked 
to Ashley Cloward about the case since it happened and that he did not really associate with 
her anymore. R. 176:69-70. Defendant's counsel then impeached this testimony, eliciting 
from Tiede that he worked with her for a short time and may have had up to twenty 
conversations with her since the incident. R. 176:70-71. However, when Tiede maintained 
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that they had not talked about the case, counsel asked: "Then why did you tell me in the hall 
just a couple of minutes ago or a couple of hours ago that the reason that Ashley knew who 
my client was was [sic] after the second robbery somebody told her it was Marco 
Villalobos?" R. 176: 72. That question only reveals that counsel spoke with Tiede either a 
couple of minutes before trial, or more likely, a couple of hours before trial. That he spoke 
with Tiede on the day of trial is not surprising and was indeed prudent. In any case, the fact 
that counsel spoke with Tiede on the day of trial does not mean he did not speak with him 
previously and the testimony did not suggest that he did not. 
Defendant also contends the exchange demonstrates that counsel "failed to grasp an 
understanding of the facts of the case." Aplt. Brf. at 22. He fails, however, to identify what 
facts counsel did not grasp and how, in any case, that misunderstanding prejudiced his 
defense. Counsel's questioning does suggest that he understood that Coward's identification 
of defendant was based on a third party's statement. R. 176: 72. Further questioning, 
however, revealed that it was Tiede, not Cloward, who had only learned of defendant's 
identity from a third party. R. 176:72. He thus testified: "/was told by somebody else that 
yes, he is the one." R. 176:72 (emphasis added). Accordingly, although the exchange may 
show counsel confused the person who did not have independent knowledge of defendant's 
identity, it clearly establishes that counsel understood that one of the two witnesses did not 
have that independent knowledge and that he effectively elicited that testimony. 
Defendant also argues counsel failed to follow up on Tiede's concession that he did 
not have independent knowledge and instead apologized to the judge. The concession, 
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however, and the point, was already made: Tiede did not have independent knowledge that 
defendant was in fact the Mexican robber. No follow up was necessary. Moreover, 
counsel's apology was made in an abundance of civility and simply for attributing the lack 
of independent knowledge to Cloward rather than Tiede. 
Finally, defendant has failed to show prejudice. Even if counsel had only interviewed,, 
Tiede minutes before trial, even if he did not fully grasp who it was that did not have^ 
independent knowledge of defendant's identity, and even if he should not have apologized . ^ 
for any misunderstanding but followed up on Tiede's response, defendant has not identified 
what testimony counsel would have otherwise elicited from Tiede or how that would have 
affected the outcome of the trial. See State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 818 (Utah App. 1994) 
(holding that the defendant did not meet the prejudice prong of Strickland where he did not 
detail what further investigation would have revealed). Having failed to do so, defendant has 
not met the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688,104 S.Ct. 
at 2065. All defendant can show is that had he more carefully interviewed Tiede, he would 
have known that Tiede, not Cloward, learned of defendant's identity as the third robber from 
a third party. However, through counsel's effective cross-examination, that fact was 
ultimately revealed. Accordingly, no reasonable probability exists that absent the alleged 
deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different. See State v. Smith, 
909 P.2d 236,243 (Utah 1995). 
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C. Trial Experience. 
Finally, defendant claims in his third and fourth claims of alleged deficient 
performance that his trial counsel did not sufficiently understand the rules of evidence and 
did not otherwise have sufficient trial experience. Aplt. Brf. at 22-24. However, as aptly 
observed by the United States Supreme Court, "[ejvery experienced criminal defense 
attorney once tried his first criminal case." United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 665,104 
S.Ct. 2039, 2050 (1984). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has also stated that "[a]n 
attorney can render effective assistance of counsel even if he has had no prior experience in 
criminal advocacy." United States v. Lewis, 786 F.2d 1278,1281 (5th Cir. 1986). The Fifth 
Circuit held that "[wjhether the defendant has been afforded his right to counsel depends on 
whether the attorney is reasonably likely to render and does render reasonably effective 
assistance, not on whether counsel has an extensive background in criminal defense work." 
Id. at 1281-82 (internal quotations omitted). Defendant here has failed to show that trial 
counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance. 
Screws9 Hearsay Statements to Defendant's Mother. Defendant points to his 
counsel's attempt to elicit testimony from defendant's mother regarding a conversation she 
had at the jail with William Screws, the robber who testified on behalf of the State. Aplt. 
Brf. at 22-23. Counsel was met with objections based on inadequate foundation and hearsay, 
including objections to his efforts to admit them as an admission of a party-opponent or as 
a prior inconsistent statement. R. 176:234-38. Defendant is correct that counsel had some 
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initial difficulty in establishing the necessary foundation. However, he ultimately did so after 
the court indicated what additional questions he needed to ask. R. 176: 234-36. 
Thus, no possible prejudice resulted in his initial failed efforts to elicit the hearsay 
statements because defendant's mother was ultimately allowed to testify about the statements 
without objection. She testified that Screws' told her he had to testify against defendant or -
he would get a longer prison sentence. R. 176: 246. She further testified that he never told — 
her "that he was told just to tell the truth." R. 176: 246. Having elicited the desired7- -
testimony, counsel cannot be said to have either performed deficiently or that his initially-
strained efforts prejudiced the defense. ; c ; ^ t ^ 
Impeachment of Ashley Cloward. Defendant also argues that his trial counsel was 
ineffective because he inadequately impeached Ashley Cloward regarding her statement that 
one of the robber's was dark complexioned. Aplt. Brf. at 24. He focuses on counsel's 
request, which was met with a successful objection, that she point to a juror whom she 
believed had a dark complexion. Aplt Brf. at 24; see R. 176: 199-200. Although he may 
have exhibited an unfamiliarity with the law in this regard, the question did not amount to 
unconstitutionally deficient performance. Indeed, if every unsuccessful attempt to elicit 
testimony from a witness constituted unconstitutionally deficient performance, all cases 
would result in reversal. Counsel in fact successfully impeached Coward's description, 
eliciting testimony that the robber also could have been Italian or Iranian. R. 176:172. He 
also elicited her concession that her original description of the robber became "kind o f a 
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"self-fulfilling prophecy" because she "thought he was a Mexican and [therefore] became 
hell bent on finding a Mexican." See R. 176: 172. 
Defendant also complains that trial counsel should not have withdrawn his attempt to 
re-call Cloward for further testimony on the hairnet defendant wore during the robbery. Aplt. 
Brf. at 23. Although the court had not ruled on the objection of the co-defendant's attorney, 
counsel for defendant nevertheless decided not to call Cloward. R. 176: 243. On appeal, 
defendant argues that by abandoning his attempt to re-call Cloward, he missed an opportunity 
to cast further doubt on her testimony. Aplt. Brf. at 24. Yet, he does not indicate how that 
testimony could have been further challenged. "[PJroof of ineffective assistance of counsel 
cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality." Fernandez, 870 P.2d at 
877. Defendant's claim here must therefore fail. 
Cross-examination of Officer Gasman. Defendant also complains that counsel was 
ineffective because he did not ask Officer Gusman if Tiede and Cloward had identified 
defendant in the mug book. Aplt. Brf. at 24. He argues that the question should have been 
asked because counsel had already unsuccessfully attempted to elicit that testimony from 
Tiede himself. Aplt. Brf. at 24. That contention is not supported by the record. On cross-
examination by defendant's counsel, Tiede was initially unsure whether he identified 
defendant in the mug book. R. 176: 80. However, on further cross-examination, Tiede 
testified that he did not believe he identified him. R. 176: 80. Later, on cross-examination 
by McDonald's attorney, Tiede unequivocally testified that he did not identify defendant. 
He testified that although he identified McDonald, he was unable to identify defendant when 
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police asked him to identify the other two robbers from one or two mug books. R. 176: 97. 
Because f iede had already testified that he could not identify defendant from the mug books, 
trial counsel had no need to question Officer Gusman on the subject. Ashley Cloward also 
clearly testified that she was unable to identify defendant from the mug book. R. 176: 172-
73. Therefore, counsel's decision not to further question Officer Gusman about their 
inability to identify defendant from the mug book was not deficient, but a reasonable 
strategic choice.7 • • '&£* 
III. THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF ^ 
ALLOWING THE TRIAL COURT TO RESOLVE DEFENDANT'S 
OBJECTION TO THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT. 
Finally, defendant argues the trial court failed to comply with section 77-18-1 (6)(a), 
Utah Code Annotated, when it failed to address defendant's allegation that he was 
erroneously given two points for use of a weapon—a board—on the "Criminal History 
Assessment" section of the presentence investigation report (PSI). Aplt. Brf. at 25.8 
Defendant argues that consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v. Jaeger, 
7Defendant also claims trial counsel was ineffective because during his opening 
statement, he remarked that "he did not know of any rule preventing him from making 
argument during opening statement" Aplt. Brf. at 23. Defendant, however, fails to 
demonstrate how this prejudiced his defense. See Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50. 
defendant also claims that he "pointed out several inaccuracies in the presentence 
investigation report to the trial judge," but does not otherwise identify those inaccuracies. 
Aplt. Brf. at 26. The appellate court will not address unidentified inaccuracies because 
the burden rests on the appellant to clearly identify any alleged errors, cite to the record 
where the alleged errors occurred, and explain why such errors constituted reversible 
error. See State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,450 (Utah 1988). Defendant has not met his 
burden. 
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1999 UT 1,973 P.2d 404, this case should be remanded with instructions that the trial court 
comply with section 77-18-l(6)(a). The State agrees the case should be remanded for the 
limited purpose of allowing the trial court to comply with section 77-18-1 (6)(a) by resolving 
defendant's objection to the PSI. The sentence, however, should not be disturbed. 
Section 77-18-1 (6)(a) provides in relevant part as follows: 
Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have 
not been resolved by the parties and the [Department of Corrections] prior to 
sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the 
judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve the alleged 
inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten working days the 
inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a determination of 
relevance and accuracy on the record. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (Supp. 1995). As explained by the Court in Jaeger, 
compliance with this section "requires the sentencing judge to consider the party's objections 
to the report, make findings on the record as to whether the information objected to is 
accurate, and determine on the record whether that information is relevant to the issue of 
sentencing." Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, f 44. "Whether the trial court properly complied with a 
legal duty is a question of law that [the appellate court] review[s] for correctness." Veteto, 
2000UT62,f 13. 
Although defendant did not personally possess a board, the PSI assessed defendant 
two points for use of a board during the commission of the robbery. See PSI, Form 3.9 At 
sentencing, counsel for defendant objected to that score, arguing as follows: 
9The PSI is part of the record in a white envelope, but was not indexed. 
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On the PSI, Judge, criminal history assessment-the weapons enhancement, Mr. 
Villalobos has been given two points because it says he had a weapon which 
was other board. It's my understanding from the trial of this matter—although 
I was not trial counsel, but it's my understanding that it was Mr. William's 
[sic] Screws that had the board. Mr. Villalobos did not have it. So we 'd ask 
that those two points be taken off which would move him to an eight. He 'd still 
be in a moderate category, but I believe it would make a difference in front of 
a parole board. 
R. 183:12-13 (emphasis added). When counsel asked the court whether it wanted to respond 
or if it wished him to proceed with argument relating to sentencing, the court directed him 
to proceed with his full argument. R. 183: 13. The court, however, sentenced defendant 
without resolving the alleged inaccuracy. SeeR. 183:18-21. As noted above, section 77-18-
l(6)(a) is clear in requiring the trial court to consider defendant's objections to the PSI and 
make findings on the record as to whether the information objected to is accurate. See 
Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, f 44. The court's failure to do so was error and the case should therefore 
be remanded for resolution of the objection in accordance with section 77-18-1 (6)(a).l0 
As in Jaeger, however, defendant has not argued, nor did he argue at sentencing, that 
the alleged error affected his sentence, and therefore, reversal is not required. Id. at % 45. 
At sentencing, counsel for defendant effectively conceded that the error was irrelevant to the 
sentencing recommendation, acknowledging that defendant would remain in the moderate 
criminal history category, but arguing that the lower score <4would make a difference in front 
of a parole board." R. 183: 13. Likewise on appeal, defendant has not argued that the 
alleged inaccuracy affected his sentence. 
10The State defers argument to the trial court on the issue of whether use of a 
weapon by a co-participant in the crime can be attributed to defendant in the PSI scoring. 
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Nor could defendant argue that the alleged inaccuracy affected his sentence. The 
court sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of one-to-fifteen years. R. 183: 18. 
The court did not impose the gang enhancement penalty as recommended in the PSL R. 183: 
19; PSI, Agency Recommendation. However, because defendant had also been convicted 
of and sentenced for the robbery involving Tiede's car, the court ordered that defendant's 
sentence be served consecutively with that sentence. R. 183: 18. The sentence would not 
have in any way been affected by the PSI score. In the first place, the court was well aware 
that defendant did not possess the weapon. See R. 183:13. In the second place, the scoring 
in no way affected defendant's criminal history categorization. Defendant's total placement 
score was 10, placing him in the moderate criminal history category. See PSI, Form 3. 
Because the moderate category includes those with scores between 8 and 11, defendant 
would have fallen into that category even if the two points for the weapons enhancement had 
not been assessed.11 Thus, whether or not defendant was given two points for the weapons 
enhancement, the recommendation of a $2,500 fine and incarceration of 24 months under the 
general disposition and time matrices would have been the same. PSI, Forms 3-4. 
Accordingly, defendant's sentence should be affirmed even on its merits. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions, but remand the case to the trial court for the limited purpose of 
uThe criminal history categories, together with their corresponding point totals, 
are as follows: Excellent (0-3 points); Good (4-7 points); Moderate (8-11 points); Fair 
(12-15 points); and Poor (16-28 points). PSI, Form 3. 
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resolving defendant's objection to the presentence investigation report in full compliance 
with section 77-18-1 (6)(a). 
Respectfully submitted this o/| day of August, 2000. 
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A. Nope, probably no. 
Q. All right. That is all I have, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Smith, you may Cross Examine. 
MR. SMITH: Thank you, Judge. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SMITH: 
Q. Mr. Teedy, you understand what perjury is? Do you know what perjury is? 
A. No. 
Q. How do you feel about lying in court? 
A. Against it 
Q. You are against it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How much SO percent, 60 percent or can you give me a percentile? 
A. 100 percent. 
Q. 100 percent against lying in court? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You talked in the hallway just a couple of hours ago right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You just told counsel thai you have not spoken to Ashley since this apparent 
second robbery correct? 
A. Well, I don't hang around with her but I guess she might call and say that hey 
something is wrong with my car, can you find one of your friends to fix it or 
something like that. So I do speak with her but we don't sit down and talk and the 
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like, I don't know. 
Q. So none ofthat I don't know stuff? 
A. Just kind of basically if she called me she wants something like me to help her 
out or something. We don't sit there and talk for recreation or whatever. 
Q. So you have talked to her five times, ten times, fifteen times since this ? 
A. Probably that is right 
Q. Ten times? 
A. I worked with her for a while after the second robbery. 
Q. So about ten times is that fair? 
A. Probably worked with her more than ten times at work. 
Q. Maybe 20 conversations with her? 
A. Yes, but I don't know. I didn't count 
Q. So the truth is somewhere between zero what you told him and 20? 
THE COURT: Counsel, approach the bench if you will please? 
(WHEREUPON, an off the record discussion was held at the bench) 
THE COURT: Back on the record. Counselor, you may continue. 
BYMR. SMITH: 
Q. I am going to clarify my question to you? 
A. Allright 
Q. Have you spoken about this case with Ashley since this second robbery? 
A. No. 
Q. Notatall? 
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A. No. 
Q. Okay. Then why did you tell me in the hall just a couple of minutes ago or a 
couple of hours ago that the reason that Ashley knew who my client was was after the 
second robbery somebody told her it was Marco Villalobos? 
A. Someone told me. 
Q. So someone told you that? 
A. Someone told me it was "Sniper" Marco. 
Q. You didn't tell me that somebody told Ashley that it was Marco and she told 
you? 
A. You misunderstood me. I don't know how she figured it out on her own. I 
didn't have to tell her or nothing. She already knew. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I was told by somebody else that yes, he is the one. 
Q. That he was the one? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Up until that point-
A. No, I have a strong belief, I know myself not that I know. 
Q. But did you not tell me that up until that conversation which somebody told 
you apparently that it was Marco Villalobos that you had never identified my client 
correct? 
A. I was not offered a police line up or nothing so I don't know. I never got to see 
his face like in person and I would have just, yes that is him at the time. Then months 
later he showed him to me again and I don't know. 
Q. Okay. I need to take a second and apologize, Judge. It was my understanding 
that counsel asked if he had spoken to Ashley at all since the second robbery. I 
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apologize to the jury and to Your Honor to the witness but you haven't spoken to her 
about this case at all? 
\ 
A. No. 
Q. Now when you initially spoke to the police officer, did you not tell the police 
officer that you had seen the Mexican before and that you had seen the Mexican 
before? 
A. Yes, told buddies. 
Q. And that the Mexican was named "Lazy"? 
A. He could. I never said but I said that he could be "Lazy" and that is his name 
but the guy that robbed me could be going under the name of "Lazy", he could. Have 
you got a picture of "Lazy" show me a picture of "Lazy"? If they had a picture of 
"Lazy" and I knew him by "Lazy" they would show me a picture and I would be able 
to identify him. That is just all I was saying. I wasn't saying that it was "Lazy". That 
is him. I don't have to see a picture or nothing. I was just trying to come to some 
kind of where we both maybe they had his name down as that and they know. Then 
they showed me a picture of "Lazy" and I could see that it wasn't him. 
Q. But you made it very clear that you had seen the Mexican before? You made 
that clear to the officer correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q.Okay. 
A. For sure. 
Q. So you had seen the Mexican before? 
A. Yes, I don't know his name and wasn't around him a lot. 
Q. Then you told me and correct me if I am wrong, then you told me that when 
this Mexican-
MCDONALD.WPD March 30,1999 RickTatton Page 74 
A. Yes. 
Q. — came into your bedroom-
A. Yes. 
Q. - that he was a foot and a half to two feet away from you? 
A. Yes, he come in and he would be looking down and he would not really 
making eye contact and kind of, he came and looked at me once and then he just off 
doing his own thing. 
Q.And then you told me the reason why you couldn't identify him in a mug shot 
or at a hearing the reason that you couldn't identify him was that I really didn't get a 
good look at him? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If I may. So you didn't really get a good look at him? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did I then not say to you, did not this Mexican leave and come back at least 
two other times and what did you say to me when I asked that? 
A. I don't know I wasn't counting. 
Q. Didn't you tell me that he had left his car and come back at least two times? 
A. Yes, I am sure. 
Q. And then I asked you to describe his appearance right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You told me he was wearing a black coat right? 
A. Yes and I am not too sure what he was wearing. I wasn't trying to see what 
they were wearing. Had a hair net on them. 
Q. Had a hair net on and you said that if he had a tail it must have been the hair 
net because, you would have remembered something like that? 
